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Abstract 
Full Name : [Ahmed Salman Hasan Al Naser] 
Thesis Title : [SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKING BASED MOVING TARGET DEFENCE 
MECHANISM] 
Major Field : [Computer Networks] 
Date of Degree : [May 2019] 
Computer networks management and configuration is challenging due to their complexity and 
dynamic nature. Configurations are often done in a decentralized fashion because the network 
devices are separated, and each controlling device has its own resources and logic. Software 
Defined Networking (SDN) is one of the new paradigms proposed to solve the management 
complexity issues with large networks. It offers a centralized point of control through separating 
the network planes. At the heart of SDN lies the controller which is an entity responsible for 
managing and configuring the various parts of the network from switches, routers and access 
policies.  
There have been many solutions to protect an SDN based network and boost its security. 
However, few works have addressed protecting the SDN controller itself. In this work, we use 
Moving Target Defence (MTD) which is a technique where the environment is constantly changing 
to deceive potential attackers and protect the SDN controller from Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks. We survey the literature for techniques that employ SDN-based MTD as security 
measure. Then, propose an approach that makes use of a distributed SDN controller environment 
and apply MTD on it. Finally, the mechanism is implemented and tested.  
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 ملخص الرسالة
 
 
 سلمان حسن آل ناصر  : أحمدالكاملالاسم 
 
 الشبكات المعرفة بالبرمجة باستخدام الدفاع المتحرك حماية الرسالة:عنوان 
 
 التخصص: شبكات الحاسب الآلي
 
 1029 مايو،: تاريخ الدرجة العلمية
 
المتغيرة والمعقدة. الاعدادات تدخل على الشبك الشبكات واعدادها تشكل تحديا نظرا لطبيعتها  إدارة
بشكل غير مركزي لكون الأجهزة منفصلة عن بعضها البعض، كل جهاز يتحكم بموارده ومنطقه. 
الشبكات الكبيرة.  إدارةحدى الطرق الجديدة التي طرحت لتحل مشاكل هي ا ةرمجبالشبكات المعرفة بال
ريقة مركزية بواسطة فصل منطق التحكم من الشبكة. في توفر هذه الطريقة وسيلة للتحكم بالشبكة بط
وإعداد أنحاء الشبكة المتعددة من مبدلات  إدارةقلب الشبكات المعرفة بالبرمجة يقع المتحكم ووظيفته 
 التمكن.  وسياسيات موجهاتها الشبكة و
يوجد العديد من الحلول لحماية الشبكات المعرفة بالبرمجة. لكن القليل من هذه الحلول يركز على 
حماية المتحكم. في هذا العمل، نقوم باستخدام أحد التقنيات الجديدة المسمية بالدفاع المتحرك. هذه 
لخداع المهاجمين وحماية الشبكة من هجمات المنع التقنية تهدف إلى تغير بيئة الشبكة بشكل متواصل 
من الخدمة. نقوم بالبحث عن الحلول الموجودة لحماية الشبكات المعرفة بالبرمجة التي تستخدم هذه 
التقنية الجديدة. بعد ذلك، نطرح طريقة لحماية المتحكم باستخدام أسلوب غير مركزي للتحكم بالشبكة. 
المقترح واختباره بعدة طرق لإيجاد مدى فعاليته.  في النهاية، نقوم بتصميم الحل
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Computer networks management and configuration is challenging due to their complexity and 
dynamic nature. A typical network consists of a large number of nodes such as switches, routers, 
and many types of middleboxes [1]. Events are continuously occurring in such networks in a 
simultaneous manner. Networks are maintained by network operators that are responsible for 
configuring the network as well as enforcing high level policies while responding to events that 
could occur. In order to enforce these policies, low-level configuration in network devices must be 
carried by the operator. 
Configurations are often done in a decentralized fashion because the network devices are separated, 
and each controlling device has its own resources and logic. These devices must be accessed 
individually and most of the time that is done through a command line interface (CLI). Moreover, 
the configuration is done on a network snapshot most of the time. This means that network changes 
that happen continuously must be accommodated manually by the network operator [1]. 
Network operators need some tools and methods that can support their work when managing and 
configuring network. This has proven to be difficult since most networks are composed of many 
propriety-based devices that are interconnected together. This led to the development of solutions 
to focus on temporary solutions such as tools that analyse and fix low-level configurations. At the 
same time, more functionality is required by operators as well as an increase in the complexity 
levels of these network policies [1]. 
Software-defined networking (SDN) is an approach that is used in computer networking to 
programmatically manage, control, and configure networks efficiently in order to improve network 
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performance and monitoring [2]. The main proposal of SDN is the decoupling of the control plane 
(routing packets), the data plane (packets forwarding), and the application plane. This architecture 
allows for a centralized approach to management which is easier to maintain and troubleshoot. 
SDN offers many advantages over traditional networks. Software is easier to change compared to 
traditional firmware and can be done through commands in the network devices. Another advantage 
is the centralization of the management process. Network operators can configure the network 
through a single point, which is the controller. This is much more convenient and easier than 
changing distributed devices individually in a traditional network. 
Despite its many advantages, SDN also faces several challenges. One being the separation between 
the control plane and data plane while still offering acceptable levels of service. The architecture 
must be able to support reliability, scalability, Quality of Service (QoS), and service management 
[3]. Another challenge that needs to be considered is providing security for SDN. With the 
separation of planes, the control plane access needs to be authenticated and authorized. Finally, to 
allow SDN to be adopted by the industry, it must be able to integrate with current networks. 
1.1 Problem Statement  
Network applications are widely spread and used in both the industry and research. These systems 
are usually exposed to a wide range of cyber-attacks. With the addition of SDN, the network layers 
are separated allowing for more ways to exploit the network. One such method is to flood the SDN 
controller with requests to bring it down. Since the controller is at heart of the SDN platform, if it 
is brought down the network will cease to function. No new flows will be installed on the switches 
making new connections impossible. This act cripples the network and therefore stops any 
applications from contacting each other through the network. 
There has been major research in securing the network infrastructure which consists of switches, 
routers and end devices. Since this area has been covered the security of an SDN-based network 
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has been boosted considerably. However, there is a gap when it comes to securing this platform. 
The SDN controller needs to be protected against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks so 
that the network can function. The motivation for this work was to fill in the gap of securing the 
SDN controller from being flooded and brought down. In this paper, MTD is used to secure the 
SDN controller by introducing a distributed controller environment. The target of this paper is to 
defend the SDN controller from being brought down by a malicious attacker. 
1.2 Objectives 
The main target of this research is to propose an approach that addresses the problem of securing 
the SDN controller from DDoS attacks. For the approach to be beneficial, it must achieve the 
following objectives: 
• Saving Network Bandwidth 
The network should not suffer an overhead that impacts the applications 
performance by a big margin. 
• Self-Configuration  
The proposed solution should adapt the network automatically without manual 
intervention from the network operator. 
• Security 
The network must be secure against DDoS attacks. 
• Scalability  
The network should be scalable without violating previous objectives or impacting 
network performance greatly. 
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1.3 Methodology 
To secure the SDN network, a distributed controller solution is employed. Using a distribute 
controller provides a robust backend for the network. On top of it, the MTD mechanism is used 
to swap the controlling entity of each network device periodically. The details of the mechanism 
required deep knowledge of several topics. In the following chapters, the background required to 
understand the solution are discussed in length. Below is a simple figure showing the basic idea 
of the implemented mechanism. As shown, the mechanism swaps the active controllers over 
time. 
 
Figure 1 Network Before MTD Cycle 
During the first cycle, Controller 1 and 2 are active and will handle the management of all the 
network devices. Meanwhile, Controller 3 will stay in an idle state, waiting for either the next 
cycle or when a failure in one of the other controllers happens. In the second figure shown, the 
second controller goes idle and the third one becomes active. Once the controller becomes active, 
it will take over the resources that lost their original controller. This process happens in handover 
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fashion. Meaning that before the second controller goes fully idle, it first hands over ownership 
of the assets it is managing. 
 
Figure 2 Network After MTD Cycle 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis will be structured as follows: 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction of the thesis topic and outlining the objectives of the research. Furthermore, an 
overview of the methodology is shown. 
Chapter 2: Software Defined Networking (SDN) 
The concept of SDN is discussed in detail including its history, a comparison with traditional 
networking paradigms, and its architecture. 
Chapter 3: OpenFlow Protocol 
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The OpenFlow protocol is discoursed in this chapter. The need for it is outlined and then its 
architecture is also shown. 
Chapter 4: Moving Target Defence (MTD) 
The MTD concept is explained here. The method difference from classical security measures is 
discussed as well. 
Chapter 5: Related Work 
The work that is related to this thesis is outlined here. The strengths and weakness are shown for 
each one. After that, the gap in research is discussed and the need for a new solution is explained. 
Chapter 6: Proposed Solution 
In this section, the proposed solution is explained in details. The threat model is disclosed and the 
countermeasures are shown. 
Chapter 7: Results Discussion 
Here, the results of the implementation are shown and then discussed. Figures are shown to 
support the research results. 
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Future Work 
Finally, the conclusion of this work is shown here. Furthermore, possible future work is discussed 
here. 
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Chapter 2 
Software Defined Networking (SDN) 
2.1 Introduction 
SDN is defined as the separation of the control logic and data forwarding in a network. The control 
logic is outsourced from the network devices to a singular entity named the Controller. The 
Controller manages the network and can be programmed through the usage of Application 
Programming Interfaces (APIs). In this section, the architecture of SDN is described in detail and 
its benefits to the network are outlined. 
2.2 SDN History 
One of the earliest efforts to decouple the control logic and forwarding functions was conducted 
by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The team proposed and published a standard 
interface named the Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) [4]. Furthermore, IETF 
pursed the same idea in the form of the Linux Netlink as an IP Service Protocol. 
There were two main reasons that these efforts were not adopted by the community. The first 
reason is that the Internet community at the time feared that the separation of the planes might 
introduce a risk. The second reason was that the vendors thought that introducing a new standard 
interface will light up a competition due to the addition of the APIs between the data and control 
planes. 
Later on, an open source implementation led to the creation of one of the major contributors to 
SDN today, which is OpenFlow. After the introduction of OpenFlow, SDN gained traction in the 
research field spawning many projects and supporting a wide variety of research topics. In 
addition to academic uses, OpenFlow was adopted by multiple deployments [5]. 
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2.3 Traditional Networking Paradigm 
In traditional networks the control and data planes are coupled together. A switch forwards data 
based on flow tables within the switch itself. To setup these devices that the network is composed 
of, each one of them needs to be accessed and configured on its own. This makes it difficult to 
establish the network and creates a burden on the network operators. 
 
Figure 3 Traditional Network Paradigm 
2.3.1 Traditional Network Layers 
Traditional networks are based on the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model. This 
model was published in 1984 by ISO and the International Telecommunication Union. The goal of 
the model was the standardization of the communications protocols without the need to consider 
the network technologies or internal structure. The model defines seven abstraction layers that 
partition the system [6]. In this paradigm, each layer will provide services to the layer below it 
while receiving services from the layer above it. 
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Figure 4 OSI Model 
2.3.1.1 Layer 1: Physical Layer 
The lowest layer at which raw unstructured data is transmitted by using a transmission medium. 
The main purpose of this layer is to convert digital bits into signals. In this layer, physical data 
rates, voltage changes, and physical connections are defined. A network topology can describe 
the components that constitute this layer. 
2.3.1.2 Layer 2: Data Link Layer 
This layer provides a node-to-node connection. The link here is direct between two nodes. The 
main tasks of this layer include detecting and correcting errors that occurred during the Physical 
Layer operation. Furthermore, it provides flow control between the two connected devices. This 
layer is divided by IEEE 802 into two sublayers. 
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• Medium Access Control (MAC) Layer: which handles permissions to send data and how 
a medium is accessed by the devices in the network. 
• Logical Link Control (LLC) Layer: which handles error detection and link synchronization 
in addition to identifying the network layer protocols.  
For IEEE 802 networks such as 802.3 Ethernet, 802.11 Wi-Fi, and 802.15.4 ZigBee, the MAC and 
LLC layers operate at the data link layer. 
2.3.1.3 Layer 3: Network Layer 
Nodes communicate across networks by employing the services of the Network Layer. This layer 
allows the transferring of variable length data sequences (packets) across different networks 
through functional and procedural means available for nodes. By definition, many nodes connect 
to a network, each connected node is permitted to transfer messages to other nodes. 
Furthermore, each node will have an address. Messages are sent through the network by 
providing the data and the address of the target node. This means that the network will handle 
the delivery of the message even if it has to pass through some intermediate nodes. The network 
will also be responsible of handling large messages by splitting them to fragments as necessary. 
These fragments are then sent independent of each other and are reassembled at another node. 
The network has an option to report any delivery errors, but it is not a requirement of this layer. 
Reliability of messages delivery is not guaranteed in this layer, it is left to the protocol to decide 
whether to provide reliable message delivery or not. Some examples of the protocols 
implemented at this layer include Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (EIGRP), Internet 
Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) [7]. 
11 
 
2.3.1.4 Layer 4: Transport Layer 
End to end transfer between hosts is the responsibility of the transport layer. It provides the 
means to transfer variable-length data sequences in terms of functional and procedural methods, 
while assuring a level of quality of service. The transport layer functions include flow control of a 
given link, segmentation, and error control [7]. There can be different types of protocols in this 
layer, some protocols provide the following services: 
• Maintain a state: meaning it keeps information about the session. 
• Connection-oriented: meaning it establishes a connection between the hosts before 
transmitting any data. 
This allows the transport layer to can keep track of the segments and provides the means to avail 
segments retransmission in case of failures in the delivery. Contrast to that, when no errors occur, 
the transport layer can acknowledge the successful data transmission and continue sending the 
next available data. The transport layer also handles messages segmentations on the data 
received from the application layer. The process of dividing messages that are long and therefore 
will not normally be transferable into smaller messages is called Segmentation. Examples of 
protocols that are commonly referred to be operate at this layer but were not developed as part 
of the OSI model are: 
12 
 
 
Figure 5 TCP connection establishment 
• Transmission Control Protocol (TCP): a connection-oriented protocol that provides 
reliable ordered delivery and error checking. 
• User Datagram Protocol (UDP): a connectionless protocol that does not provide reliability 
nor error checking and sends messages in no particular order. 
2.3.1.5 Layer 5: Session Layer 
Connections between computers are controlled in this layer. At the application level, connections 
are established then managed between the local and remote hosts. It also terminates the 
connection. Procedures that allow controlling the session by checkpointing, suspending, 
restarting, and terminating it are provided with the option of full-duplex, half-duplex, or simplex 
operation. This layer is present in the OSI model but absent in the Internet Protocol Suite. Its 
functions, which include gracefully closing a session, are handled in the Transmission Control 
Protocol in the implementation of the Internet Protocol Suite. Applications that make use of 
remote procedure calls often implement this layer [7]. 
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2.3.1.6 Layer 6: Presentation Layer 
Application layer entities make use of the presentation layer to establish a context between each 
other, in which a mapping between them might be provided that allows using different syntax 
and semantics [7]. Presentation protocol data units could be encapsulated inside the session 
protocol data units If a mapping is available and then they can be passed down the protocol stack. 
By providing a translation between application and network formats, this layer can provide 
independence from data representation. The application takes the transformed data from the 
presentation layer in a form it accepts. Data formatting is handled by this layer when sending 
across the network and it is sometimes referred to as the syntax layer. Compression can be availed 
in this layer. 
2.3.1.7 Layer 7: Application Layer 
The end user interacts with the application layer making it the OSI layer closest to him/her, this 
creates a common point of contact between the user and the OSI model as both of them access 
the application layer. A communication component is needed to be implemented in the software 
when interacting with this layer. As far as the OSI model scope goes, such application programs 
don’t belong in it. The main functions of this layer include identifying communication partners, 
determining resources availability, and synchronizing the communication between the partners.  
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Figure 6 Application Layer Protocol Example - HTTP 
To identify a communication partner, the application layer determines the identity and availability 
of the communication partner for an application with data to transmit. Applications may employ 
more than one application entity in this layer. Take for example website used to order products. 
Such site might make use of two application-entities: one using HTTP when communicating with 
users, while the second records orders and sends them to a remote database protocol. Both these 
protocols are not particularly concerned with orders. The application implements the for the 
orders itself. The availability of the resources cannot be determined by the application. Some 
examples of the protocols that fall under this layer are HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and DNS. 
2.3.2 Network Devices 
2.3.2.1 Router 
In computer networks, forwarding data packets is carried by a device called the router. Over the 
Internet, routers have the duty of directing the traffic to reach the destination. Data packets could 
contain things like a web page or an email and is sent through the Internet. Routers forward 
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packets on their interfaces from one to another throughout the network until the packets arrive 
at the destination network device. 
2.3.2.2 Switch 
Computer networks employ a device call a network switch (which is also often referred to as 
switching hub, bridging hub, officially MAC bridge) to connect devices on a computer network in 
order to carry a multitude of functions including using packet switching to receive, process, and 
forward data to the destination device. Operating at the data link layer (layer 2) of the OSI model, 
a network switch is a multiport network bridge that processes and forwards data which is enabled 
by employing hardware addresses. There exist also some switches that can operate at the 
network layer (layer 3) which allows them to incorporate routing functionality in addition to their 
basic functions. 
2.4 The Need for SDN 
The number of devices that are connected to the internet in the recent years has skyrocketed. 
Many types of devices are now connected such as mobile devices, smart home devices, and 
normal desktop devices. The traditional networking architecture is not able to support the 
increasing needs of the users. Some of the trends that lead the need to introduce a new paradigm 
capable of supporting a dynamic network include [8]: 
• Traffic Patterns that change: classically, devices were communicating as client-server to 
retrieve the data to the user. However, in the recent trends, devices access multiple 
databases and servers while users are pushing for data from multiple types of devices 
which might operate in a moving environment. 
• Information Technology Customization: users are accessing the network from many 
devices such as smart phones, tablets and notebooks. IT needs to accommodate the 
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needs of these users while still maintaining a high standard of protecting corporates data 
and upholding compliance. 
• Cloud Services: another technology that is becoming more popular is the employment of 
cloud computing. Enterprises need to access its applications on demand while still 
maintaining security requirements. The environment must also be easily adaptable to the 
ever-changing demands of business. 
2.5 SDN Architecture 
The primary concept of SDN is the decoupling of the intelligence from the forwarding devices and 
moving it to a centralized controller [9]. As illustrated by Figure 1, the structure of SDN can be 
divided into application layer, control layer, and infrastructure layer. 
2.5.1 Infrastructure Layer (Data Layer) 
 Consists of the network devices such as routers, switches, and access points. This layer is 
responsible for forwarding packets according to the rules/policies assigned. This layer forms the 
infrastructure of the network to work on by connecting the various devices together. Since the 
control layer is extracted from this model, the devices in the infrastructure are accessed through an 
abstraction. 
2.5.2 Control Layer 
The mediator between the infrastructure and application layers. It contains the controller which 
controls the SDN functions. The controller installs forwarding rules on the switches and routers 
through programming [9]. Communications between the controller and the infrastructure are 
enabled by the southbound interface such as OpenFlow. Using the southbound interface, this layer 
can access the abstractions of the infrastructure layer in order to control the network devices. On 
the other hand, the northbound interface will be serving as an access point for the applications. This 
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can be done by using APIs to access the devices. As an example, an application could gather 
statistics about the network devices by using the functionalities of this interface. 
2.5.3 Application Layer 
The highest layer in the architecture and is responsible for business and security applications. Many 
applications are contained in this layer such as mobility management, intrusion detection systems, 
network virtualization. This layer communicates with the controller through the northbound 
interface. 
 
Figure 7 SDN Architecture showing the three layers: infrastructure, control, and application. 
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2.6 SDN Capabilities 
SDN is enabled mainly through the usage of a central controller that manages the network elements 
such as routers, switches, and firewalls through a program. Through this feature, SDN can adapt to 
dynamic network changes by adjusting the flows to enhance network performance. Furthermore, 
the abstraction through layers, where different layers can be interfaced by APIs, alleviates the 
burden on programmers [10]. As consequence of the abstraction, the application layer does not 
interact with the infrastructure components directly. There are many tools that support this 
abstraction like Frentic [10] and pyretic [11]. Physical infrastructures can be shared by multiple 
users through virtualization [12]. Network virtualization software is made available by many 
companies such as VMWare, Microsoft, Hyper-V, Citrix, Xen server, and RHEL [12]. 
2.7 SDN Controllers 
There are many SDN controllers in the field and several ways to categorize them. One possible 
categorization is whether a controller is centralized or distributed [13]. In a centralized controller, 
all forwarding devices are managed by a single entity. This creates a single point of failure and 
harms scalability. In addition, one controller could fail to handle the management of a large 
network. Some examples of centralized controllers are NOX-MT [14], Beacon [15], and Floodlight 
[16]. 
Alternatively, distributed controllers can adapt to any environment requirements through scaling 
up [13]. Distributed controllers can be made of either a centralized cluster of nodes or a distributed 
set of network components. Some examples of distributed controllers are Onix [17], HyperFlow 
[18], and ONOS [19]. Distributed controllers mostly operate on a weak consistency semantics, this 
implies that data updates are eventually carried on all controller nodes. Opposite to that, having 
strong consistency guarantees that the most updated property will be read by all controllers after a 
write operation. Very few controllers provide strong consistency with Onix and ONOS as 
examples. 
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Name Architecture Northbound 
API 
Consistency License Prog. 
Language 
Beacon [15] Centralized 
multi-threaded 
Ad-hoc API No GPLv2 Java 
Floodlight [16] Centralized 
multi-threaded 
RESTful API No Apache Java 
Kandoo [20] Hierarchically 
Distributed  
_ No _ C, C++, 
Python 
HyperFlow [18] Distributed _ Weak _ C++ 
Onix [17] Distributed NVP NBABI Weak, Strong Commercial Python, C 
NOX-MT [14] Centralized 
multi-threaded 
Ad-hoc API No GPLv3 C++ 
OpenDayLight 
[21] 
Distributed REST, 
RESTCONF 
Weak EPL v1.0 Java 
ONOS [19] Distributed RESTful API Weak, Strong _ Java 
POX [22] Centralized Ad-hoc API No GPLv3 Python 
Ryu NOS [23] Centralized 
multi-threaded 
Ad-hoc API No Apache 2.0 Python 
SNAC [24] Centralized Ad-hoc API No GPL C++ 
Trema [25] Centralized 
multi-threaded 
Ad-hoc API No GPLv2 C, Ruby 
Table 1 SDN Controllers Classification [13] 
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Chapter 3 
OpenFlow Protocol 
3.1 OpenFlow Overview 
One of the main protocols enabling SDN is OpenFlow [26]. Through OpenFlow, switches and 
routers flow tables can be programmed as necessary. Traffic can be partitioned by network 
administrators to allow research and production to coexist in a network. This allows researchers to 
conduct experiments and try new security mechanisms on the same network without affecting 
production.  
3.2 OpenFlow History 
The OpenFlow standard is under the management of the Open Networking Foundation (ONF) 
[27]. ONF is the main promoter of the SDN paradigm and it is led by users. OpenFlow has been 
defined by ONF as the first communication interface that has been standardized to orchestrate 
the connection between the SDN architecture layers [26]. Network devices can be manipulated 
by OpenFlow through direct access. Such devices include switches and routers which can be either 
physical or virtual. OpenFlow serves as way to take back network control from proprietary 
network switches into an open source one that can be contributed to by the community. 
3.3 The Need for OpenFlow 
OpenFlow was introduced due to the lack of a solution that could process a huge number of 
packets needed for a college research project. Commercial products were too expensive and the 
open source implementations at the time needed for a programmable network were inefficient. 
A more flexible approach was required that needed to satisfy several assumptions including [26]: 
• Provides high performance while minimizing the cost. 
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• Capable of enabling a wide variety of projects and research subjects. 
• Could isolate production traffic from development traffic. 
• Compliant with the needs of a closed platform. 
3.4 OpenFlow Architecture 
In traditional networks, control of the packets flow is handled by the network devices (e.g. switches, 
routers, etc). These devices are built by commercial companies using their propriety code. Each 
vendor has its own firmware that needs to be interfaced with in a different way than the other. This 
makes it difficult for researchers to design and implement their projects using the current available 
resources. An open source alternative is needed so that the researchers can have a transparent 
platform to work with. 
The idea of OpenFlow is quite simple, flow tables that are already in use by Ethernet switches and 
routers are reused by the standard to build firewalls, implement NAT, provide QoS, and gather 
various statistics about the network. 
OpenFlow allows to separate the development flows from the productions ones by providing an 
open protocol to program routers and switches flow tables. Researchers have control on how to 
handle their flows, starting from how to process them and including the path they traverse. This 
allows the researchers to experiment with new protocols, security mechanisms, and even 
implementing IP replacements [26]. 
OpenFlow switches data path are built with a flow table and for each flow entry, an action is 
associated. It is possible to extend the list of actions performed by an OpenFlow switch. To provide 
a high level of performance while incurring a low cost, the data path needs to offer some 
flexibility. This dictates that a range of actions that are somewhat limited but still prove to be 
valuable. 
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Figure 8 OpenFlow switch architecture. 
OpenFlow switches are made of three different essential components. First, (1) flow tables that has 
an association between flow entries and actions. They also require a (2) secure channel that 
connects the SDN controller to the switch allowing commands and packets to be exchanged. 
Finally, the (3) OpenFlow protocol, which is open standard that describes communications between 
the controller and the switches. Figure 2 shows the described OpenFlow switch architecture. 
Switches can be classified into two categories 1) dedicated OpenFlow switches that do not 
implement any of the layer 2 and layer 3 functionalities and 2) OpenFlow-enabled switches that 
have been preloaded with the OpenFlow protocol and contain several interfaces. 
3.4.1 Dedicated OpenFlow Switches 
A dedicated OpenFlow switch acts a dumb forwarding only device that is used a s data path by 
the controller. From this switch’s point of view, flows are constrained by the implementation of 
the Flow Table. As an example, flows could be just a TCP connection between two hosts. The flow 
could also be all the VLAN tag sharing packets. For each flow entry, an action is assigned to it [26]. 
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As mentioned before, the actions list can be expanded, however the basic ones that each 
OpenFlow switch comes with are [26]: 
1. Forward the packet to a target port. This is the most basic function of a switch. Without it, 
routing the packets through the network would be impossible. 
2. Encapsulate the flow and send it to a controller. In this action, the packet is encapsulated and 
sent through the secure channel to the controller. This occurs most of the time when a new 
flow arrives to the switch and it does not correspond to any flow rules it has. In such cases 
the controller’s aid is needed to determine if a new flow entry needs to be installed to 
accommodate this packet. 
3. Drop the packet flow. This is mostly used to secure the network against attacks. The most 
basic attack that could harm the network if this action was omitted is the DDoS attack. It 
would flood the switch with a huge amount of new flows and bring it down. 
3.4.2 OpenFlow-enabled Switches 
These switches will have the enhanced features of the OpenFlow protocol installed on them. They 
will also have a secure channel that the dedicated switches can use to communicate with the 
controller as well as Flow Tables [26]. Most of the time, TCAM will be reused by the switches for 
Flow Tables to use. 
Switch Type Dedicated OpenFlow Switch OpenFlow-enabled Swtich 
Forwarding Yes Yes 
Use Secure Channel Yes Yes 
Install Flows No Yes 
Table 2 OpenFlow Switches Types 
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3.5 OpenFlow Controllers 
In the OpenFlow environment, a controller is responsible for adding and removing flows to the 
switches. A controller can be as simple as an application that runs inside a normal PC. In this case 
it might be used to interconnect multiple other PCs together for the sake of the experiment. In 
general, OpenFlow can be thought of as a generalized version of the VLANs concept [26]. 
At a higher level, a controller can also be much more sophisticated. It could dynamically add and 
remove flows from the switches. This can occur in real time as the experiment is taking place. 
Furthermore, a controller can separate multiple experiments flows allowing researchers to reuse 
it multiple times. 
 
Figure 9 OpenFlow Network Example [26] 
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3.6 OpenFlow Channel 
A communication channel is used between the controller and the network switches specifically 
for OpenFlow messages exchange. The OpenFlow protocol initiates this channel between the 
controller and each switch. It is possible to establish more than one connection originating from 
one switch to a single controller or even to multiple controller. The connections can be classified 
to either a master connection or a slave connection. Some of the connections can be established 
as equal as well [26]. 
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Chapter 4 
Moving Target Defence (MTD) 
4.1 Traditional Security and Attacks Methodology 
In classical security mechanisms, the assumption is a static network setup with minimal changes 
in topology. To attack such networks, the malicious entity first surveys it in order to find out 
potential vulnerabilities in the network. After identifying such vulnerabilities, the attacker 
attempts to exploit them and either bring down the network, or attempt to acquire unauthorized 
access on the assets of the network. Furthermore, an attacker could control some of the assets 
and make them act as zombies for future activities. 
 
Figure 10 Traditional Network Defence Using Access Control 
From a defender point of view, protecting the system can be done by controlling access on the 
network assets [28]. This could be either a physical isolation or through network access policies. 
For example, an access policy could be placed on a certain asset to protect it from unauthorized 
access. This guards the data and blocks attackers from gaining it. This does not come at no cost 
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however, the more rules are added to the network, the harder it becomes for regular users to 
access the assets. More importantly, this introduces an overhead on the network that delays 
requests. 
Another possible method of guarding the network is by remodelling its structure [28]. This 
includes patching out system vulnerabilities or upgrading the system resources. Since at the core 
of an attacker strategy, the existence of a vulnerability is a requirement for an attack to succeed. 
This approach invalidates attacks that rely on vulnerabilities to succeed. However, it is inefficient 
to patch out all vulnerabilities in the system, especially if it was a large one consisting of many 
subcomponents that are developed independently. Some of these might even be acquired from 
third parties making it harder to identify the vulnerabilities. 
It can be concluded from the above that such traditional techniques might be ineffective against 
a continuous surveying attack alongside with a long-term analysis of the network. Furthermore, 
finding and amending all the vulnerabilities in a system is difficult task to accomplish cognitively. 
To summarize, the main challenges [28] are: 
• The predefined network structure gives the attackers an easier prey due to it being 
susceptible to long-term analysis. Malicious entities can collect information about the 
network for as long as needed before attempting to attack it. From that point on, the 
attacker would have the advantage which might include zero-day vulnerabilities. While 
on the other hand, the defender has a hard time exploring all possible attack vectors and 
patching out all vulnerabilities. 
• The static aspect of the network allows the attackers to slip in unnoticed malicious plug-
ins by carefully placing them after an analysis is conducted. Given enough time, an 
attacker could open a backdoor for future attacks as well. Meanwhile, the defender might 
28 
 
have trouble detecting intrusions in real time. Not to mention that there is a time frame 
when a vulnerability is discovered until it is patched that could be exploited by the 
attacker. 
• The connected nature of the network provides a perfect target for attackers. Once an 
attacker gains access through one point of the network, attacking the other assets 
becomes relatively easier. In contrast to that, a defender needs to maintain a security 
level on all the access points and all components of the network. Providing a 
comprehensive defence on the network is necessary although tough to achieve. 
4.2 Moving Target Defence Definition 
The concept of MTD has been introduced in 2009 at a security summit. The definition kept being 
clarified over the years. Recently, MTD is defined as a technique that formulates, creates, 
analyses, and deploy a system in a continuously changing manner while maintaining complexity 
to deceive attackers and increase the time required to study the system in order to increase the 
system resiliency [28]. 
Under traditional networks defence mechanisms, the attack surface that an attacker observes 
expands time goes on. This is due to the static nature of the network. Moreover, the certainty of 
the configuration keeps increasing since it does not change over time. To counter this, MTD’s 
constant changing of the network layout creates a bigger attack surface that keeps mutating over 
time. This reduces the effectiveness of the analysis on the network and increases the cost of the 
attack. 
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Figure 11 Attack Surface with and without MTD [28] 
4.3 Moving Target Defence Overview 
At the core of MTD is the adaptation process [29]. Initially, a system is deployed in a normal state 
that it can operate on. After it starts running, an MTD begins adapting the system’s configurations. 
The adaptation can be triggered through an intrusion detection system (IDS) alert or by evaluating 
the environment data. The process of adapting the system occurrence can be fixed to certain timings 
or can be randomized. Furthermore, it can also be triggered through an external source. Any new 
changes in the configurations must be valid, meaning that these changes must satisfy the system’s 
constraints. If the adaptation process is found to be valid, it is implemented on the target system. 
The main goal of an MTD system is to remove the attackers’ advantage of time [29]. The traditional 
approach to securing a system is by reducing the attack surface [30]. This means that the system is 
protected by removing unnecessary software, closing unused ports, or updating the software to its 
most recent iteration. However, this leads to several problems including insufficient authentication 
mechanisms, complex firewall rules, and places a substantial overhead on maintaining access 
control and credentials. These issues usually lead to an extended period of the configurations 
remaining static. 
With MTD, the attack surface is hardened through adaptive approaches. These approaches attempt 
to make changes to the attack surface at runtime, this alleviates the burden on the administrator by 
automating the responses to the system. However, approaches that fall under this category require 
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considerable effort to develop and deploy, not to mention the large number of intrusions/malwares 
signatures that are maintained by the MTD system. Moreover, such systems can be weak to zero-
day exploits. 
 
Figure 12 MTD with IP Addresses 
A concept introduced by [29] is the exploration surface. It refers to the exploration or 
reconnaissance part of cyber-attacks that occurs before launching an attack on the system. The 
purpose of this phase is to understand the system better by scanning the open ports, finding the 
online machines, or understanding the network topology. The authors of [29] explain how to 
differentiate between the attack surface and exploration surface through the example of a C class 
IPv4 address. In this example, the exploration surface consists of the subnet of IPv4 addresses that 
follow the C class subnet, such as {192.168.0.1, 192.168.0.2, . . . 192.168.0.254}. Where the attack 
surface can be simply the online computers in this same range. If there is only one, then the size of 
the attack surface is 1. 
4.4 Moving Target Defence and DDoS 
MTD proves to be a good technique to mitigate DDoS attacks. In traditional setups, the attacker 
could flood a controller by sending too many requests to install new flows. This would overflow 
the controller with requests and will prevent it from serving the actual packets coming into the 
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network. Since the controller would be busy processing the new flow requests, any new flows 
would suffer a long delay before they get processed, if they do at all. 
 
Figure 13 DDoS Attack on SDN Network 
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Chapter 5 
Related Work 
There have been many works proposing solutions to secure networks by employing SDN or MTD. 
Few works attempt to combine the two concepts together to create an adaptive secure system on 
top of the flexible SDN architecture. In this section, the recent efforts to secure systems using either 
SDN, MTD, or a combination of the two are outlined and discussed. 
MASON, a framework that can be used for cloud vulnerabilities and intrusion events assessment 
is developed by the authors of [31]. The framework employs port hopping as a countermeasure 
after it identifies high-security risk in a network service. However, in this approach, QoS is not 
considered when taking MTD decisions. 
A defence by pretence mechanism is proposed by the authors of [32] that focuses on defending 
against flood attacks. The solution provided by the paper targets cloud environments. The attack 
the authors were interested in countering is DDoS in the context of SDN. This approach however 
does not address targeted attacks like Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). 
An information flow control security architecture is presented in [33]. The introduced solution 
combines the placement of the SDN controller and host-based information flow tracking. The 
authors implement a prototype through a host agent. However, if the host is compromised, the host 
agent can be disabled which opens the controller to a DDoS attack which will exhaust its resources. 
A moving target defence architecture is proposed by [34]. It makes use of random address hopping 
and random finger printing. The authors also purpose a model that allows network configurations 
to be mutated validly. Furthermore, the authors of [35] propose a three-layer model for comparing 
MTD approaches and evaluating their performance. A case study is used as a means to show how 
the model works and highlight the viability of the model. 
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IP addresses mutation is used by the authors of [36] as an MTD mechanism within OpenFlow. The 
approach mutates IP addresses with high unpredictability but still minimizes the overhead on 
normal operations. This method however focuses only on countering the exploration phase of 
cyber-attacks. The approach is not studied in its effectiveness to defend against DDoS and 
application layer attacks. 
The authors of [37] study SDN-based MTD techniques and discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of such systems. They explain how to evaluate systems of this nature and discuss the 
challenges and the methods used to overcome these challenges. They conduct several experiments 
and conclude that SDN-based MTD increases the overhead for the attacker in terms of time and 
traffic load. However, the focus of the paper is on introducing the concept and the experiments are 
carried out mainly to study the overhead introduced on the exploration surface. A more advanced 
system needs to be implemented that can handle more attack cases. 
In [38], the authors propose a system to defend against blind DDoS attacks by employing an SDN-
based MTD approach. Blind DDoS is one of the threats targeting SDN and is introduced by the 
authors. It is analysed and an attack defence approach is proposed. The proposed solution works 
over a multi-controller environment making it scalable. However, the approach makes use of 
random packet transmission delay which affects normal traffic. Furthermore, synchronizing multi 
controllers route tables is not considered in the approach, each controller regenerates its own 
routing tables. 
A scalable SDN-based MTD solution to protect cloud networks is proposed by [39]. The approach 
makes use of Attack Graphs (AG) to assess attack scenarios then select the required 
countermeasures to reconfigure the network. Furthermore, the paper proposes a conflict detection 
framework that ensures that a consistent policy state is maintained in a distributed SDN-based cloud 
environment. This approach focuses on securing cloud environment and might not be suitable for 
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other settings. It also uses a predefined database of signatures making it susceptible to zero-day 
attacks. 
CHAOS, an SDN-based MTD system is proposed by the authors of [40]. In this approach, the 
hierarchy of all hosts in a network are obfuscated through many mechanisms including IP 
obfuscation, port obfuscation, and fingerprint obfuscation. They conduct experiments and the 
results show that information disclosure is reduced while still allowing normal flow of traffic. The 
paper however focuses mainly on minimizing information disclosure without attempting to counter 
DDoS attacks. 
A technique that is a scalable form of MTD using SDN is proposed in [41]. The approach enables 
defenders to differentiate between trustworthy and untrustworthy clients by employing pre-shared 
keys, applying cryptographic MACs, or embedding passwords to provide access control. 
In the context of Internet Service Providers, the authors of [42] investigate the effectiveness of 
MTD techniques using SDN. The authors make use of ONOS [19] and focus on it. The research 
indicated that the chance of a DDoS attack succeeding decreases as more network traffic is 
processes by a high number of collaborative partners. The results of the paper also show that wide 
scale attack on the network can be mitigated through MTD. 
In [43], the authors propose a method to secure against unauthorized access by employing an IP 
address hopping MTD within an SDN environment. The proposed technique is implemented at the 
hop level as well as at the data plane level which reduces the overhead cause by it. The authors also 
built an IP address synchronization algorithm that avoids causing overhead on the network by using 
a one-way hash and piggybacking on the regular communications of the network. 
A scheme that randomizes the namespace U-TRI is introduced in [44]. The purpose of this scheme 
is to hide packets identifiers. The proposed scheme allows for attack surface movement by using a 
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hierarchical virtual namespace. Furthermore, by randomizing the namespace, it boosts the 
capability to withstand attacks. 
A heterogenous redundant security scheduling mechanism is shown in [45]. The authors use a 
multi-controller setup and the non-dominated sorting algorithm, MDSA, to secure the network 
while attempting to maintain load balancing. This strategy also relies on the dynamic nature of 
MTD to adapt the network. In this study, 5 different operating systems are chosen for the sake of 
simplicity. The authors take into consideration a single controller structure, a static redundancy 
structure, random scheduling reliability priority scheduling, and MDSA when comparing. 
In [46], the authors make use of the SDN network to protect it from DDoS attacks. A formal 
solution is shown based on Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT). The purpose of the solution 
presented in the paper is to reduce the sharing of critical links across the SDN planes, data and 
control. However, since the mechanism is making use of the network assets themselves, it generates 
an overhead on the network. 
An MTD based solution to monitor cloud networks and software vulnerabilities targeting attacks 
and identify them is presented by the authors of [47]. The authors make use of Markov Game to 
find out the attacker’s optimal policy then puts in place countermeasures to defend the network. 
However, to make the solution work, a linear program must be solved which can become 
computationally inefficient. To balance this out, the authors assume that only action pairs are used 
by the defender who has observability of the attacker’s action. 
Most of the works discussed above attempt at securing the network infrastructure. Meaning they 
focus on securing the network switches, routers and links. The works discussed make use of MTD 
in an SDN environment which is a great way to employ it. However, the works do not attempt to 
secure the SDN controller which is a vital component in an SDN environment. If a DDoS attack 
were to be launched on the controller, the whole network will be incapacitated. 
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In this work, the focus will be to secure the SDN controller from DDoS attacks. The concept of 
MTD will be applied on an SDN controller to protect it from being taken down. Since the network 
infrastructure security has been discussed by many works as shown above, in this work it will not 
be tackled. It will be assumed that the adversary’s main target is to bring the network down by 
attacking the controller. 
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Chapter 6 
Proposed Solution 
6.1 System Model 
6.1.1 Threat Model 
In the attack model used in this work, it is assumed that the attacker can be located inside or outside 
the network. The main target of the attacker is to bring down the SDN controller of the network 
rendering the network useless. The attacker may use zombie machines in order to perform a DDoS 
attack on the controller. In this solution, the network devices such as switches, routers and end 
devices are not part of the defence mechanism. The mechanism does not handle encrypted traffic, 
nor does it use IDS to detect attacks. The proposed solution can work in conjunction with other 
security measures that attempt to scramble the network devices IP address periodically. 
 
Figure 14 Threat Model 
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6.2 Proposed Solution Overview 
The approach will attempt to secure the controller from DDoS attacks and exploration attacks while 
still providing acceptable performance to normal traffic. The main challenges include supporting 
scalability, hiding information from attackers, and protecting the infrastructure availability. To this 
end, a distributed controller system will be used as the building stone for the MTD mechanism. 
Since by design, distributed controllers will have the capability to withstand DDoS attacks to an 
extent, adding the MTD mechanism on top of them will boost the availability of the system greatly. 
The next sections describe the structure of distributed controllers’ systems and explain the proposed 
method to secure them in detail. 
6.2.1 Distributed Controller Network 
A distributed controller model is shown in the figure below. The controllers communicate with 
each other for updates and maintain a virtually centralized state of the network. The OpenFlow 
switches are connected through a secure channel to their respective controller. In addition to that, 
the switches have their normal communication links with other switches regardless of the controller 
they belong to. 
 
Figure 15 Distributed Controller Topology 
The model shown above is often described as flat SDN control. This is since the network is divided 
into horizontal areas with each area being managed by a controller. This model provides reduced 
control latency and improved resiliency. 
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6.2.2 Moving Target Defence Algorithm – Groups 
In order to secure the network against attacks, an MTD mechanism is designed and implemented. 
The algorithm for this mechanism is shown below. It assumes that X controllers and N devices 
(switches and hosts) exist in the topology. The controllers will be distributed into two groups. Every 
S second, the algorithm will re-assign the devices into the other group controllers equally. While a 
group is active, the other group will go into idle mode where the members will wait until the 
algorithm wakes them up, or if a failure occurs in the network. 
The mechanism assigns to each device in the network a unique identifier. This identifier is used 
when changing the device master. Each device will have a corresponding identifier and the 
identifiers are updated at the beginning of each cycle. When new devices are discovered by the 
controller, they will be assigned new identifiers. 
Algorithm 1: MTD Groups Pseudocode 
Assuming Two Controller Groups 
INPUT: S (float), ControllersList (List), CurrentActiveGroup (int) 
1. WHILE (TRUE) 
2.      SLEEP (S SEC) 
3.      ControllersList = OnlineControllersList(); 
4.      FOREACH Device IN ControllersList DO: 
5.           IF CurrentActiveGroup == 1: 
6.               AssignDeviceToMaster(Device, Group_2)  
7.           ELSE 
8.               AssignDeviceToMaster(Device, Group_1) 
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Figure 16 Algorithm 1 Flow Chart 
By using this algorithm, an attacker will not be able to identify a target to bring down. An important 
design decision is the length of the switch interval. This interval dictates when the mechanism will 
switch between the controller groups. If this interval is set to a small value, the switch will happen 
too frequently which will disrupt the network and impact performance heavily. However, if it is set 
to a long period, it will give enough time to the attacker to explore and analyse the network 
structure. In order to determine a suitable value, several experiments are conducted, and the results 
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are used to find a middle ground value that does not impact the system behaviour extensively while 
moving around the resources often enough to deceive potential attackers. 
The MTD mechanism is implemented in Python. It issues commands to the ONOS cluster and 
receives information from it such as current topology and active devices. The mechanism is tested 
on a virtual machine, the details are discussed in the next section. 
6.2.3 Moving Target Defence Algorithm – Random 
The algorithm above is modified to produce a new one that does not rely on groups but rather 
considers the whole cluster when making choices. The difference between the algorithms is that 
the second one will attempt to alternate between half of the available controllers randomly. This 
makes it even harder to analyse the structure of the system. The algorithm takes care to not choose 
the same master in subsequent choices. This is to have more controllers involved and to not over 
burden a single node. 
Algorithm 2: MTD Randoms Pseudocode 
INPUT S (float), ControllersList (List) 
1. WHILE (TRUE) 
2.      SLEEP (S SEC) 
3.      FOREACH Device IN ControllersList DO: 
4.            AssignDeviceToMaster(Device, RANDOM_Controller)  
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Figure 17 Algorithm 2 Flow Chart 
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Chapter 7 
Results Discussion 
The experiments are built on top of several platforms and systems. This includes a virtualization 
software, distributed SDN controllers, SDN network emulation system and other tools. Below is a 
highlight of the most important software that enabled this work. 
7.1 Supporting Software 
7.1.1 Virtualization Software 
The experiment is built using a virtualization software. There are several virtualization software’s 
that can be used to emulate operating systems. VirtualBox was used in this work; however, the 
same procedure can be done using VirtualBox or any other virtualization software.  
In virtualization, there are two main entities, the host and guest machines. The host machine is the 
one running directly on the hardware while the guest machine is the one running inside the 
virtualization software. A guest machine can be configured with custom specifications as needed. 
For example, RAM can be set as 2 GB. This is of course subject to the hardware that is being used. 
A virtual machine cannot use more than the available resources. In this work, VirtualBox is used 
to run the required virtual machines.  
7.1.2 Mininet 
Mininet [48] is a network emulator which can be used to create a network of virtual hosts, switches, 
controllers, and links. Mininet hosts run a standard version of Linux network software, and its 
switches support OpenFlow for highly flexible custom routing and Software-Defined Networking. 
Mininet networks can run real code including standard Unix/Linux network applications as well as 
the real Linux kernel and network stack. 
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Mininet can be invoked through Python programs which is a powerful way to utilize it. It has a rich 
API available that allows the network topology to be designed and deployed easily for simulations. 
In this work, a topology is built using Mininet and then it is connected to the remote controller. 
This provides isolation of the components making it easier to debug and identify problems. 
7.1.3 ONOS 
In this work, the distributed controller network is built using the Open Network Operating System 
(ONOS) [19]. It supports OpenFlow but can be easily extended for other southbound protocols. 
ONOS is a high throughput, fault-tolerant and, more importantly, can automatically optimize itself 
after a fault. For this work, the controller will be used to implement a moving target defence 
mechanism. The controller is running on a virtual machine and connected to the Mininet 
environment for testing. 
ONOS has a rich API that can be used to interact with it. It also allows developers to create 
applications and program them with Java then load them into the system. It has both a command 
line (CLI) and graphical user interface (GUI) that can be used to control it [19]. ONOS allocates 
the network devices into controllers that will act as masters for these devices. Each controller will 
have a subset of the network to manage. When a controller fails, its devices will be assigned to 
another controller. This boosts the network availability significantly. 
7.1.4 Atomix 
Atomix [19] is a framework that allows the construction of fault-tolerant and scalable distributed 
systems. It can manage clusters and detect failures and has rich JAVA and REST APIs. Atomix is 
used in conjunction with ONOS for data storage and coordination of clusters.  
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Figure 18 ONOS Web UI 
7.1.5 Architecture 
The next figure shows the overall architecture of the system. ONOS clusters access Atomix clusters 
for data and coordination. They also control the network by installing flow rules into the OpenFlow 
switches active in Mininet. The MTD mechanism reads information from the ONOS clusters and 
makes decisions to alter the topology as needed. It does this by issuing commands to the ONOS 
clusters which in turn will adapt accordingly. 
 
Figure 19 Overall System Architecture 
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7.2 Simulation Setup 
In order to test the solution a computer is used that will contain several virtualized systems. These 
systems will interact with each other within the virtualized space. The computer uses an Intel i7-
6700 CPU clocked at 4.00 GHz. It is loaded with a 16 GB RAM and the virtualized space is 
allocated 100 GB of drive space. 
7.3 Experiment 1: Packet Loss 
7.3.1 Network Topology 
In this experiment, a network of linearly connected switches is built. Each switch connects two 
hosts yielding a topology like the figure below. The network is made of N switches and M end 
devices. 
 
Figure 20 Network Topology 
7.3.2 Controllers Setup 
For this experiment, four distributed instances of ONOS will be used. In addition, three instances 
of Atomix are used for data storage and coordination of the controllers. The controllers’ topology 
would look like the figure below. Each instance of ONOS is connected to all three Atomix 
instances. It is possible to use more Atomix instances and/or ONOS nodes, but for the sake of 
simplicity and to make it easier to analyse the system the below is used.  
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Figure 21 Controllers’ Topology 
Furthermore, for the MTD mechanism to operate, the ONOS nodes are divided into two groups as 
shown in the table. The mechanism alternates these groups between two states, active and inactive. 
During the active states, members of that group will be responsible of the network control while 
the other group goes into idle mode. The idle group will wait until the MTD mechanism wakes 
them and then will take over ownership of the nodes while the other group goes idle. 
ONOS NODE GROUP 
ONOS-1 Group 1 
ONOS-2 Group 2 
ONOS-3 Group 1 
ONOS-4 Group 2 
Table 3 ONOS Groups 
In this experiment, each host will send an ICMP packet to each other host in the network. The 
objective is to find out the average packet loss while the MTD security mechanism is active and 
compare it to normal system behaviour. The below results were gathered for different lengths of 
switching intervals. The experiment was repeated 15 times over 4 hours with each cycle taking 
approximately 16 minutes and the results were averaged to what is shown in the table Below. With 
12 switches, we have a total of 24 hosts connected. The mechanism is tested over several switching 
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intervals. The average packet loss without the mechanism is constant as it is the normal system 
behaviour. It can be observed from the results that the mechanism will perform poorly when the 
switch occurs frequently. However, as the time is increased, it stabilizes to an acceptable amount. 
Number of 
Switches 
Switch 
Interval 
(sec) 
Average Packet Loss % 
(With MTD) 
Average Packet Loss % 
(Without MTD) 
12 5 0.229 0.012 
12 6 0.024 0.012 
12 7 0.036 0.012 
12 8 0.036 0.012 
12 9 0.024 0.012 
12 10 0.024 0.012 
12 15 0.012 0.012 
Table 4 Packet Loss Percentage Comparison 1 – Algorithm 1 
 
Figure 22 Average Packet Loss Percentage – 12 Switches – Algorithm 1 
The curve shown in the figures depicting the average packet loss start with a high percentage due 
to the high number of changes in the network devices master controller. After the time is increased 
the number of dropped packets plummets substantially since the controllers will have more time to 
learn the network topology before changing the master controllers again. 
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The same experiment is performed using algorithm 2. The results in terms of packet loss does not 
vary that much from the first algorithm. However, the randomness introduced will make it harder 
to explore the current network and find a controller to target. 
Number of 
Switches 
Switch 
Interval (sec) 
Average Packet Loss % 
(With MTD) 
Average Packet Loss % 
(Without MTD) 
12 7 0.174 0.042 
12 9 0.100 0.042 
12 11 0.085 0.042 
12 13 0.074 0.042 
12 15 0.074 0.042 
12 17 0.060 0.042 
12 19 0.065 0.042 
Table 5 Packet Loss Percentage Comparison 1 – Algorithm 2 
 
Figure 23 Average Packet Loss Percentage – 8 Switches – Algorithm 2 
7.4 Experiment 2: CPU Utilization (Mechanism Overhead) 
In this experiment the purpose is to find out the CPU usage of the mechanism before it is tested 
with an actual attack to measure its overhead. A topology similar to what was shown in the previous 
experiment is ran and the random algorithm is used to control the master nodes. The CPU utilization 
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is captured for normal system behaviour (without the MTD tool running) and then its captured 
again while the tool is running. 
The below result was captured for CPU utilization. It is important to note that this utilization is for 
the user processes and does not include the utilization of the operating system kernel that the 
experiment is running inside. This reduces the noise from other processes running on the kernel 
level and gives better perspective of tool CPU usage. 
It can be observed that when the tool invokes the change on the nodes master, there is a spike in 
CPU utilization. Since this experiment was running with a 10 second sleep interval, a spike can be 
seen every 10 seconds in the graph. 
 
Figure 24 CPU Utilization 
7.5 Network Bandwidth Consumption 
With respect to the network overhead introduced by the mechanism, it is quite minimal. Consider 
the example of the 12 switches setup used in the previous experiments. In order to make the 
change between the master controllers, one packet is sent to each device from the newly 
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appointed controller. This packet will direct the device to be governed by the now active 
controller while the previous master goes idle. 
The figure below shows the relation between the number of packets sent in order to enable the 
mechanism to work. It can be observed that it is a meagre amount and will not impact the network 
bandwidth at all. 
 
Figure 25 Network Bandwidth Overhead 
7.6 Proposed Solution Validation 
To validate the solution in this thesis, we reproduce the work shown by the authors of [38] and 
compare our results with it. The solution shown in the paper attempts to protect the network by 
introducing multiple controllers to the network. A flooding attack is launched on the network and 
the CPUs readings of the controllers are collected to show that the attack is being mitigated. The 
attack is made of three parts: the reconnaissance stage, the attack stage, the persistence stage.  
The reconnaissance stage is an important step of the attack as it determines whether the attack 
can be launched or not. This is because the blind DDoS attack used is only effective against SDN-
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based networks. This stage also helps with determining the range of IP addresses to attempt when 
launching the attack so that it helps with optimizing the attack. 
The attack stage is where the actual attack is launches to bring down the network. In this stage a 
huge number of packets is sent to the controller in order to bring it down. The paper simulates 
various types of packets attacks such as TCP, UDP, and ICMP. Here we replicate TCP based attacks 
for the sake of simplicity. 
The last stage is the persistence stage. In this stage the attacker would attempt to persist 
something on the controller to facilitate future attacks. This could be a backdoor for example. In 
this thesis we do not focus on these types of attacks and the proposed solution does not attempt 
to protect against them thus the assumption is that no such attack will be made. 
In the reproduced paper experiment, a randomly selected IP is attacked with packets of the size 
of 64 bytes. Four switches are attacked and It is assumed in the simulation that the attack flows 
sent respectively are A1, A2, A3 and A4, and attack flow rate is 200 Mbps×4 (e.g.A1 = A2 = A3 = 
A4 =200 Mbps). 
The figures below show the reproduced results of the paper. It can be seen that with a single 
controller, the attack destroys the controller and brings its CPU capacity so high. However, when 
employing multiple controllers, the attack is unable to fully bring down the network. 
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Figure 26 Blind DDoS Attack Tests (Reproduced Paper Results) 
 
Figure 27 MTD Against Blind DDoS Attack (Reproduced Paper Results) 
7.7 Proposed Solution Blind DDoS Attack 
Next a blind DDoS attack is launched against the proposed solution setup. The same attack used 
in the reproduced paper is launched again. A randomly selected IP is attacked with packets of the 
size of 64 bytes. With similar parameters as the previously shown attack flows. In the proposed 
solution attack test however, the test is done on four controllers’ setup. This is because the 
solution depends on having multiple controllers to operate. 
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After a first look at the results of the proposed solution the main difference can be observed. The 
proposed solution will have an individual CPU usage percentage higher than the solution in the 
reproduced paper. This is due to having fewer controllers working concurrently as the proposed 
solution makes use of idle controllers instead of having them all operate at the same time. 
However, the solution is still capable of operating the network on acceptable levels under the 
attack. 
On average, the proposed solution CPU usage percentage is similar to the reproduced paper. The 
results below show that during idle time, the controllers will have low CPU consumption while the 
other active ones will take on the burden. As they keep alternating, the controllers will also 
alternate the burden of the attack instead of accumulating it over time. 
 
Figure 28 MTD Against Blind DDoS Attack 
 
7.8 Proposed Solution Limitations 
The solution provides protection against DDoS attacks by employing a distributed controller 
scheme. This dictates that the network resources should be able to handle the attack capacity. 
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The proposed solution will not be able to handle a vicious attack that is capable of bringing down 
all the controllers in the system. If an attacker is capable of sending a huge number of packets 
such that all the controllers in the system are overloaded or are brought down, then the network 
will be breached. 
The solution proposed is unable to protect against persisted attacks. An example of a persisted 
attack is sending a malware that installs a backdoor in the network. In that case, the solution will 
not be able to protect against such an attack as it does not analyse the network traffic but simply 
relies on the number of packets sent in the network. 
Furthermore, the solution aim is to protect the SDN controller rather than the network resources 
themselves. It is meant to be used in conjunction with other solutions that can protect the 
network resources such as routers and switches. Therefore, attacks that target the router or 
switches of the network will not be mitigated by the solution. 
In addition, the solution is not capable of smartly balancing the load on the controllers. It simply 
chooses the devices assignment to controllers based on their numbers. If it is possible to assess 
the load incurred by the network devices, for example using the average number of new packets 
sent to a controller, it would enhance the solution considerably. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion and Future Work 
8.1 Conclusion 
The SDN paradigm is one of the developing platforms in the field. It offers a new way to control 
and configure the network without relying on the traditional de-centralized methods. By offering 
the separation of the data and control planes, it becomes easier to control the network. The SDN 
controller that lies at the heart of this paradigm serves a crucial role to enable this platform. This 
renders it a target for potential malicious entities. 
The current works that were explored in this research focused on protecting the network assets 
excluding the controller. This gap gives an opening in the system which can be exploited to bring 
it down though a DDoS attack. In order to secure the system against this possible breach, the 
controller needs to be secured. It was shown that protecting the controller could incur an overhead 
on the system that needs to be minimized. 
In this work, an SDN distributed controller system is secured through the employment of MTD. 
The distributed controller approach provides the network with the robustness it needs to survive 
DDoS attacks. 
With respect to the objectives proposed at the beginning we managed to achieve the following: 
• Saving Network Bandwidth: the implemented solution uses a minimal number of 
messages to achieve its purpose. This is shown in section 7.4 of the thesis. 
• Self-Configuration: the implemented solution automatically adapts the network by re-
assigning the devices to a controller after each cycle of sleep. 
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• Security: the implemented solution will be able to withstand DDoS attacks as long as not 
all of the controllers are brought down. The network will be able to operate as long as some 
of the distributed controllers are online. 
• Scalability: the implemented solution is built using a distributed controller platform. By 
definition this makes it scalable. When the number of devices in the network increases, 
more controllers can be added to accommodate this change. 
Several experiments were conducted to test the performance of the implemented approach. The 
main factors to test were how long does it take to discover the network topology through a 
connectivity test. Secondly, CPU impact induced by the mechanism is evaluated. It was shown that 
an acceptable system performance can be achieved while still securing the system against potential 
attackers. Experiments were conducted to verify the integrity of the mechanism introduced. 
8.2 Future Work 
For future work using a testbed rather than simulating the mechanism over virtual machines would 
show more accurate results. By nature, virtualization machines are limited by the capabilities of the 
host machine. Thus, to test this solution over a large network, a machine with great resources is 
needed. Having an actual testbed that can be configured as needed to simulate the network would 
allow for more accurate results. 
Furthermore, this mechanism protects against attacks targeting the SDN controllers, if the data 
storage nodes (i.e. Atomix nodes) were brought down, the system will also collapse. Since ONOS 
relies on the Atomix nodes for storage and coordination, it makes the nodes a vital part of the 
system. Securing the Atomix nodes will provide a more robust system. 
Another improvement that is possible on the proposed solution is to provide a load balancing 
mechanism. Instead of alternating the controllers based on the number of devices they control, 
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assessing the controllers load expected to happen from the devices connected then making an 
informed decision on which devices to assign to which controller will enhance the solution. 
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